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Michael Frakes*
Using data on physician behavior from the 1979–2005 National Hospital Discharge Surveys
(NHDS), I estimate the relationship between malpractice pressure, as identified by the
adoption of noneconomic damage caps and related tort reforms, and certain decisions faced
by obstetricians during the delivery of a child. The NHDS data, supplemented with restricted
geographic identifiers, provides inpatient discharge records from a broad enough span of
states and covering a long enough period of time to allow for a defensive medicine analysis
that draws on an extensive set of variations in relevant tort laws. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, I find no evidence to support the claim that malpractice pressure induces physicians
to perform a substantially greater number of cesarean sections. Extending this analysis to
certain additional measures, however, I do find some evidence consistent with positive
defensive behavior among obstetricians. For instance, I estimate that the adoption of a
noneconomic damage cap is associated with a reduction in the utilization of episiotomies
during vaginal deliveries, without a corresponding change in observed neonatal outcomes.
I. Introduction
A number of empirical studies to date have attempted to explore the relationship between
physician behavior and measures of malpractice pressure. Of course, the existence of any
such relationship need not signify a problem with the malpractice system itself. It may
simply indicate that malpractice liability is working in the intended manner—that is, by
deterring physicians from acting in an otherwise undesirable manner. The intent of these
empirical investigations, on the other hand, is generally to identify situations in which an
imperfectly designed system of malpractice liability causes physicians to produce a sub- or
supra-optimal level of care, often referred to as “defensive medicine.”
Defensive medicine discussions often focus on the contribution that malpractice
pressure makes to aggregate health-care costs. In this regard, the concern is largely over
so-called positive defensive medicine, in which physicians perform additional procedures
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and order extraneous tests in order to reduce their potential malpractice exposure.
However, malpractice forces need not operate in this direction on all occasions. The threat
of malpractice liability may also induce physicians to avoid performing high-risk procedures
or accept high-risk patients, leading to a reduction in aggregate expenditures. In the context
of certain procedures, positive and negative forces may even offset each other, leaving no
resulting impact on physician behavior.
In this article, I explore the role that malpractice pressure plays in shaping certain
obstetric practices. Acknowledging that the threat of malpractice liability may have distinct
effects on different components of obstetric care, I estimate the relationship between
malpractice pressure and each of the following individual utilization measures: (1) epi-
siotomy utilization during vaginal delivery, (2) hospital lengths of stay during delivery
admissions, and (3) cesarean section utilization. Certain of these utilization measures are
more likely than others to implicate positive defensive medicine concerns given the nature
of the medical circumstances in which they arise (e.g., the risks involved in their imple-
mentation, the conditions they are intended to treat, etc.). For instance, while some risk is
involved in the performance of an episiotomy, such risks arguably pale in comparison to the
more general risks involved in the vaginal delivery itself. As such, malpractice fears may
induce an obstetrician to perform an otherwise unnecessary episiotomy during a vaginal
delivery under the belief that this action will alleviate potential liability from failing to
properly deliver the child.
Consistent with much of the malpractice literature, I identify variations in prevailing
malpractice pressure using adoptions of various tort reforms, the effect of which is largely
to reduce the probability that malpractice suits are filed. While physicians are generally
insured against losses in malpractice cases (and typically pay premiums that are not expe-
rience rated), they may nonetheless be quite sensitive to the threat of a potential malprac-
tice suit in light of the significant reputational and nonpecuniary costs that are associated
with malpractice liability (Currie & MacLeod 2008). The adoption of malpractice laws and
other tort reforms may operate to reduce the expected levels of damages imposed in the
event that a physician has been found liable. This reduction in expected liability may leave
plaintiffs less inclined to bring suit, thereby lessening the level of pressure placed on
otherwise insured physicians. The reforms that I emphasize in this analysis, and that have
received the most attention by the malpractice literature to date, are caps on noneconomic
damage awards—that is, caps on pain and suffering awards.
A large body of related literature has explored the relationship between tort reforms
and various outcomes of the malpractice marketplace: claims frequency, claims severity,
insurance premiums, and physician location.1 These studies suggest that noneconomic
damage caps are perhaps the most relevant and most influential tort reform measures
(Mello 2006). Twenty-eight states currently have noneconomic damage cap provisions in
place, most of which were adopted during the malpractice crisis of the mid-1980s. Accord-
ingly, those studies relying on post-1980s data to evaluate the association between noneco-
nomic damage caps and physician behavior (e.g., Currie & MacLeod 2008) fail to draw on
1See Mello (2006) for an extensive review of this literature.
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the most relevant sources of variation in malpractice law. In this study, I explore questions
regarding defensive practices using data on physician behavior from the 1979–2005
National Hospital Discharge Surveys (NHDS). The NHDS data, supplemented with geo-
graphic identifier codes, provides inpatient discharge records from a broad enough span of
states and covering a long enough period of time to allow for a defensive medicine analysis
that draws on an extensive set of legislative variations.
Consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the relevant medical circumstances, I
find evidence that a reduction in malpractice pressure, as identified by adoptions of various
tort reforms, is associated with decreased utilization of episiotomies during vaginal deliv-
eries and with the number of days spent in the hospital in connection with the delivery of
a child (suggesting that greater malpractice pressure is associated with increased utilization
of the indicated measures). At the same time, however, such pressure is not associated with
any improvements in neonatal outcomes, as proxied by infant Apgar scores, suggesting (at
least in the episiotomy case) that the malpractice-induced changes in utilization may likely
be defensive in nature. On the other hand, confirming the findings of Currie and MacLeod
(2008), I find no evidence to support the conventional wisdom that malpractice pressure
induces obstetricians to perform unnecessary cesarean sections.
This article proceeds as follows. Section II provides a review of the related literature
concerning defensive physician practices. Section III offers a simple framework by which to
evaluate a physician’s response to malpractice pressure. Section IV describes the data and
empirical methodology, while Section V presents results from the relevant regression
analyses. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. Literature Review
Malpractice scholars and analysts are often inconsistent in their definition of “defensive
medicine,” but the type of behavior that I hope to identify as being “defensive” in nature is
that in which malpractice liability causes physicians to take sub- or supra-optimal levels of
care, where optimality is determined according to an appropriate weighing of the costs and
benefits of care. This behavior is, of course, inherently difficult to identify. In the alterna-
tive, I follow Kessler and McClellan (1996) and related studies and classify observed behav-
ior as being of a positive defensive nature when malpractice pressure induces physicians to
provide extra levels of care without leading to corresponding health benefits. Negative
defensive behavior, on the other hand, is identified by situations in which malpractice
pressure induces physicians to avoid otherwise beneficial care.
Most of the literature exploring the effects of malpractice/tort reforms has focused
on first-stage litigation- and insurance-related outcomes (e.g., claims frequency and mal-
practice premiums); a smaller, yet significant, literature has explored the second-stage
effects of tort reform on physician behavior. In perhaps the seminal study on the defensive
nature of physician practices, Kessler and McClellan (1996) found that malpractice reforms
that directly reduce malpractice pressure (“direct” reforms) are associated with a 5–9
percent decrease in total hospital expenditures incurred for patients in the one-year period
following an acute myocardial infarction or new ischemic heart disease, without substantial
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reductions in mortality rates or complications. Direct reforms include caps on damages
awards (noneconomic, punitive, and total) and reforms of the collateral source rule.
Currie and MacLeod (2008) consider an empirical approach similar to that taken by
Kessler and McClellan (1996) but focus on the case of cesarean deliveries, a treatment that
is often implicated in popular discussions of defensive medicine and that is a common
target of scholarly defensive medicine investigations. Using data from the Vital Statistics
Natality files from 1989–2001, Currie and MacLeod test the conventional wisdom that
malpractice fears over improperly performed vaginal deliveries induce obstetricians to
perform excessive numbers of cesarean sections. Contrary to these expectations, they
actually find that the adoption of a noneconomic damage cap (representing a reduction in
malpractice pressure) leads to an increase in cesarean utilization.
Currie and MacLeod (2008) contend that this finding is consistent with a model of
physician behavior that provides for variations in patient conditions. Significant risks do
occur during the commission of a vaginal delivery, which would otherwise induce physi-
cians to opt for cesarean delivery. However, if the marginal patient receiving a cesarean
delivery has a favorable case mix and is relatively inappropriate for that delivery, then the
risks to performing a cesarean section on this marginal patient may outweigh the general
risks of delivering her baby vaginally. Two recent studies (Frakes forthcoming; Baicker et al.
2006) have documented evidence of triage in regional cesarean utilization, where physi-
cians begin to perform cesareans on mothers with fewer and fewer indications for cesarean
delivery as cesarean rates increase within regions. In light of this evidence and considering
the possibility that financial incentives may operate to push regional cesarean rates to
elevated levels, it may be reasonable to assume that the marginal mother is inappropriate,
in an absolute sense, for cesarean delivery. Accordingly, it may be reasonable to assume that
a physician treating this marginal mother is sensitive to the risk of improperly performing
a cesarean delivery and that malpractice pressure thus pushes the cesarean rate downward
(not upward) on the margin.
Consistent with the findings of Currie and MacLeod (2008), it follows then that the
reduction in malpractice risks associated with the adoption of a noneconomic damage cap
may alleviate these downward pressures and possibly lead to an increase in the equilibrium
cesarean rate. This increase may occur in a situation where prereform liability pressures
(based on fears over improperly performing cesarean sections) had kept physicians from
practicing at an otherwise desired higher cesarean rate—for example, in a situation where
prereform liability fears discouraged physicians from “inducing” demand among their
patients in response to prevailing financial incentives.2 Avraham and Schanzenbach (2009)
describe this possibility as one where tort reform may increase the ability of physicians to
practice “offensive medicine.”
The findings of Currie and MacLeod stand in contrast to certain other studies that
have explored the relationship between malpractice pressure and cesarean utilization,
though from different methodological frameworks. For instance, using 1990–1992 Natality
2Of course, it is possible that the resulting cesarean rate will increase following reform where physicians otherwise face
fewer liability constraints to increase cesarean utilization for other, nonfinancial reasons.
460 Frakes
data, Dubay et al. (1999) estimate a county fixed-effects specification and find a positive
association between cesarean utilization and malpractice insurance premiums. Finding no
corresponding evidence of a positive association between premiums and health outcomes
(as indicated by the incidence of a low Apgar score), they conclude that the observed
behavior is defensive in nature. Similarly, using discharge data from acute care hospitals
in New York State in 1984, Localio et al. (1993) find a positive association between cesar-
ean utilization rates and malpractice premiums and claims frequency (controlling for
patient severity and other factors). Other studies, however, confirm the results of Currie
and MacLeod to the extent that they document no evidence of positive defensive medi-
cine in cesarean utilization. Baldwin et al. (1995), for instance, find no association
between cesarean utilization and physicians’ claims exposure, as measured by both per-
sonal physician claims experience and the prevailing practice environment (i.e., county
claims per physician).
Using variations in certain characteristics of the malpractice marketplace (e.g., claims
frequency) to identify defensive behavior, these additional studies implicate general con-
cerns over unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with both the outcome of
interest and the relevant malpractice characteristics. The approach taken by Currie and
MacLeod (2008), however, draws on within-state variation of an arguably exogenous
nature: the adoption of tort laws that are, for the most part, applicable to torts generally and
that were, in many instances, adopted in response to broader crises in commercial casualty
insurance—that is, not solely in response to more specific crises in medical malpractice
lines (Matsa 2007).
In the analysis below, I also identify defensive behavior using the adoption of
various tort reforms. However, I build on Currie and MacLeod (2008) by exploring phy-
sician behavior over a longer time horizon, including the entirety of the 1980s, a decade
during which the heart of the noneconomic damage cap adoptions occurred. By focusing
on 1989–2001 data, Currie and MacLeod only consider the adoption of noneconomic
damage caps by four states, two of which invalidated the relevant statute within several
years. They also consider variation in noneconomic damage caps for four other states
whose courts invalidated caps previously adopted in the pre-1989 period. However, there
may be good reason to exclude from the specification those states that invalidate damage
caps over the sample period. Drawing on variations in the invalidate direction may lead
to less precise estimates given the possibility that physicians may respond weakly to a law
that has a high probability of being stricken down (Matsa 2007).3 As discussed further
below, the possibility of anticipated changes in physician behavior prior to the invalidated
damage caps may also limit the ability to perform important falsification exercises that test
for differential trends in utilization rates between treatment and control states in the
prereform period. By limiting the specifications to exclude states that invalidated reforms,
however, there are only two states from which to identify defensive behavior during the
3For a related discussion of the incentives posed by uncertainty over the constitutional validity of damage cap reforms,
see Avraham and Bustos (2010). Avraham and Bustos’s analysis, however, focuses on incentives within a dispute
resolution context, as opposed to a first-order clinical decision-making context.
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1989–2001 period, implicating concerns over the consistency of the estimated results
(Conley & Taber 2011).
Drawing on data over this longer timeframe, the analysis below includes nearly 20
states with pure noneconomic damage cap adoptions (i.e., where such states did not also
invalidate or repeal the relevant statutes). With a greater number of treatment states, it is
more likely that spurious state-year shocks that are uncorrelated with damage cap laws will
average each other out, leaving consistent estimates of the effect of such reforms (Conley
& Taber 2011). Building on the above studies, I use this rich set of legislative variation to test
for evidence of defensive behavior in cesarean utilization. However, I also explore for
defensive behavior in two related obstetric practices/measures: episiotomy utilization and
the number of days that mothers spend in the hospital in connection with the delivery of
their children.
III. Malpractice Pressure and Obstetric Practices
Defensive medicine discussions often focus on the role that malpractice pressure plays in
driving up total expenditures; however, malpractice fears are likely to impact physician
behavior in a highly context-specific manner. In many situations, this fear may indeed be
expected to induce physicians to perform additional procedures and order extra tests.
In other situations, however, this fear may result in the avoidance of particular behaviors.
To understand how liability can lead to such opposite results, it helps to begin with a
consideration of the context in which a medical procedure is performed.
In a given medical context, I treat malpractice liability fears as generally arising from
two fundamental directions: (1) fear over improperly treating (or diagnosing) an under-
lying disease or medical condition and/or (2) fear over improperly performing a treatment
meant to resolve or alleviate that underlying disease or condition. These risks inherently
find themselves in tension with each other, in that a physician risks exposing himself or
herself to liability from this first direction by capitulating to the fears arising from the
second direction. That is, if a physician avoids performing a particular high-risk treatment
over fear of committing an error in the process, he or she is exposed to potential liability
from failing to properly treat the condition/disease itself. Thus, the relationship between
the underlying level or extent of malpractice pressure and the utilization rate for the
treatment in question will depend on which of these two risks dominates under the
circumstances.
This simple framework follows from Currie and MacLeod’s (2008) model of physi-
cian behavior in the face of potential malpractice liability. A fundamental implication of
their model is that (1) a physician’s choice between performing a procedure and not
performing a procedure depends on the relative malpractice (and other) risks of each such
choice and (2) accordingly, a legal-induced increase in expected malpractice liability
decreases procedure utilization if and only if the prevailing risks associated with the proce-
dure itself exceed those that prevail in the absence of its utilization. A key feature of their
model is that these calculations vary depending on the condition or health status of
the patients. Consider a situation in which the marginal patient receiving the procedure
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(i.e., the patient just indifferent between receiving and not receiving the treatment) is in
relatively little need of the procedure. The no-procedure option for this patient may pose
little risk relative to the risk of improperly performing the treatment itself, leading to the
possibility of negative defensive behavior.
Ultimately, the effect of a reduction in potential malpractice liability (e.g., that
resulting from tort reform) on the utilization of a given procedure is an empirical question
that depends on the risks ensuing from the execution of the procedure versus the risks
relating to the failure to treat the underlying condition, evaluated with respect to the
marginal patient. With these considerations in mind, I consider the effect of various tort
reforms on the utilization rate of several procedures (or medical decisions) that are likely
to present different risk-risk tradeoffs.
A. Episiotomy Utilization
An episiotomy is a surgical incision made in the tissue between the vagina and the perineum
during a vaginal delivery. Extremely common procedures, episiotomies were performed in
nearly 40 percent of the vaginal delivery sample considered below, though their rates have
declined considerably over time. Although some of the traditional justifications for epi-
siotomy utilization are no longer widely held (e.g., the belief that controlled incisions heal
better than natural tears), episiotomies are still indicated in the event of certain complica-
tions of birth, such as abnormal presentation or fetal distress, or in instances in which an
expedited delivery is necessary.4
The circumstances surrounding episiotomy utilization are supportive of a possible
positive defensive response to malpractice pressure. Though there are some morbidity risks
to the performance of an episiotomy, including an increased risk of fecal incontinence, the
expected harm from such risks arguably pales in comparison to the potential mortality and
morbidity risks that are generally faced during the vaginal delivery of a child. Moreover,
even if the benefits of episiotomy are minimal in most instances, as long as there is some
legitimate belief that episiotomies are indicated in certain high-risk situations, this imbal-
ance of risks may lead some risk-averse physicians to utilize episiotomies on a relatively
common basis. If anything, physicians may be inclined to perform arguably unnecessary
episiotomies for purely “optical” reasons—that is, to enhance the appearance that they took
every step possible to prevent harm to the mother and child. Moreover, for much of the
sample period, many of the risks associated with the performance of an episiotomy were not
well documented5 and it was not until 2006 that the American College of Obstetricians-
Gynecologists issued guidelines recommending restricted, as opposed to routine, use of
episiotomies.
4For a recent discussion of the risks and benefits of episiotomy utilization, see Hartmann et al. (2005) and American
College of Obstetricians-Gynecologists (2006).
5Beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing to the present, a number of clinical trials have analyzed the risks of
routine versus restricted use of episiotomies (Hartmann et al. 2005).
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B. Delivery Bed Days
During the course of an in-patient delivery admission, physicians are also faced with the
decision of how long the mother and child should stay in the hospital (aside from the
separate but related decision of whether to perform a cesarean section). An additional
day in the hospital itself poses little inherent risk to the mother and child (aside from the
greater risk of a hospital-acquired infection). However, the additional monitoring pro-
vided by an extra in-patient day may alleviate general risks faced during the neonatal
period. The tradeoff in these risks suggests that physicians may respond in a positive
defensive manner to the threat of malpractice liability. Moreover, even if an additional
bed day does not significantly reduce neonatal risks, physicians may be inclined to keep
certain high-risk mothers longer purely to bolster appearances in potential malpractice
suits.
Cesarean-adjusted length-of-stay measures may reflect express physician decisions
regarding neonatal monitoring durations, but they may also, in part, proxy for various
noncesarean procedures or treatments performed in the neonatal period. To the extent
that any such treatments also pose few risks in their executions, relative to the general risks
involved in delivering a child, physicians may further respond in a positive defensive
manner to the associated malpractice forces.
C. Cesarean Utilization
Considering the evidence of triage in cesarean utilization within regions found in Frakes
(forthcoming) and Baicker et al. (2006), and in light of the high cesarean rates prevailing
in regions, it may be reasonable to expect that the marginal cesarean delivery is not, in an
absolute sense, truly in need of cesarean delivery. Thus, with respect to the marginal
cesarean patient, the risks posed by cesarean delivery may actually be high enough relative
to those posed by a standard vaginal delivery that defensive cesarean behavior, though
popularly expected, fails to hold in practice (Currie & MacLeod 2008).
D. Tort Reform Type
In the analysis presented below, I focus on estimating the impact of reforms that place caps
on the amount of noneconomic damages (i.e., damages for pain and suffering) that
plaintiffs can be awarded. Noneconomic damages represent a significant portion of the
typical malpractice damages award. Using a data set of 326 closed claims in Texas for the
1988–2004 period (each with at least a $25,000 payout), Hyman et al. (2009) document an
average noneconomic damages award of $681,000 (in 1988 dollars, compared with
$542,000 for economic damages), occurring in 272 (or 83 percent) of the closed claims
included in the sample. Noneconomic damage caps represent the tort reform measure that
has been most commonly associated with an observed change in certain malpractice
outcomes: claims severity, physician supply, and malpractice premiums.6 Twenty-eight states
6See Mello (2006) for a comprehensive review of relevant studies.
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currently have in place laws that cap noneconomic damage awards.7 Seventeen states
adopted such laws during the mid-1980s (five of which subsequently invalidated or repealed
the relevant provisions). Table 1 lists those states that modified their noneconomic damage
cap laws over the sample period considered in the empirical analysis below.
In most of the specifications estimated below, I also explore the association between
physician behavior and certain additional types of malpractice/tort reforms, including caps
on punitive damages awards, reforms of the collateral source rule, and other “indirect” tort
reforms. Punitive damages are awarded on a much rarer basis in malpractice actions than
are noneconomic damages awards (without a correspondingly large increase in average
awards/payouts).8 Thus, relative to noneconomic damages, it is less likely that the threat of
liability for punitive damages will have a considerable impact on physician behavior.
Similar to caps on noneconomic and punitive damages, amendments to the tradi-
tional collateral source rule represent malpractice reforms that operate to directly reduce
7The vast majority of these states have laws that are specific to noneconomic damage awards. However, for the
purposes of this analysis, I also classify states as having noneconomic damages provisions if they have laws that place
caps on total damages awards, where such laws necessarily cap noneconomic damages as well. Considering the
imposition of state fixed effects, this decision has relevance only in the context of one state (Texas) that experienced
variation in the presence of a total damages cap at a time when it did not have a specific noneconomic damage cap
in place. Only one additional state (Colorado) experienced variation in the incidence of a total damages cap over the
sample period (two years following the adoption of a noneconomic damages cap). With such little within-state
variation in mind and considering the fundamental overlap between a total damages caps and a noneconomic
damages cap, I do not separately control for the incidence of a cap on total damages. However, the estimation results
for the remaining coefficients remain essentially unchanged when I do include this additional covariate.
8For evidence of this claim, see Cohen (2005) and Hyman et al. (2009).
Table 1: Variations in Noneconomic Damage Caps (1979–2005)
State Year Adopted Year Dropped State Year Adopted Year Dropped
Alaska 1986 Mississippi 2003
Alabama 1987 1992 Montana 1996
Colorado 1987 North Dakota 1996
Florida 2004 New Hampshire 1987 (2) 1981 (1); 1991 (2)
Hawaii 1987 Ohio 2003 (2) 1992 (1)
Idaho 1988 Oklahoma 2004
Illinois 1995 1998 Oregon 1988 2000
Kansas 1987 Texas 2004 (2) 1988 (1)
Massachusetts 1987 Utah 1988
Maryland 1987 Washington 1986 1990
Michigan 1987 Wisconsin 1986
Minnesota 1986 1990 West Virginia 1986
Missouri 1986
Notes: Years of adoption and invalidation/repeal (if applicable) of laws imposing caps on noneconomic damage
awards in malpractice cases (or tort cases generally) are indicated above. States are included only if their relevant
malpractice laws varied over the 1979–2005 period. Legislative variation is excluded from this table if it represents a
situation in which an adoption and invalidation/repeal occurred during the same year.
Source: Database of State Tort Law Reforms (2nd).
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the expected level of damages awarded in malpractice actions (Kessler & McClellan 1996).
Traditional collateral source rules generally prohibited defendants from introducing evi-
dence of compensatory payments made to plaintiffs from outside sources (e.g., payments
from insurance companies). Thirty-three states currently have laws in place that eliminate
this traditional rule, effectively reducing the compensatory damage awards that plaintiffs
can obtain by amounts received from such outside sources. Many of these amendments also
occurred during the mid-1980s, often contemporaneously with the adoption of noneco-
nomic damage cap laws. Nonetheless, there are a substantial amount of independent
reforms of each type to allow for identification of the effect of these separate provisions.
Table 2 lists those states that adopted collateral source rule reforms over the sample period
considered below.
Finally, following the classification of malpractice reforms introduced by Kessler and
McClellan (1996), I estimate the general impact associated with a set of reforms that more
indirectly (relative to damage caps and collateral source rule reforms) reduce the expected
level of damages imposed in malpractice actions. Included in this set of “indirect” reforms
are contingency fee limitations, requirements of periodic payment of future damages,
joint and several liability reforms, and provisions for a patients’ compensation fund.9
In their seminal study on defensive medicine, Kessler and McClellan (1996) document a
small positive effect of “indirect” reforms on malpractice intensity, as proxied by the total
9While the emphasis of this article is on damage cap reforms and collateral source rule reforms, I include indirect
reforms to control for residual liability initiatives by states. The results presented below for the damage caps and
collateral source rule reform coefficients are entirely robust to inclusion of a richer set of controls for each of the
individual components of Kessler and McClellan’s indirect reform category.
Table 2: Variations in Collateral Source Rule Reforms (1979–2005)
State Year Adopted Year Dropped State Year Adopted Year Dropped
Alabama 1987 (1); 2001 (2) 1997 (1) Montana 1988
Colorado 1987 North Dakota 1988
Connecticut 1986 New Hampshire 1981
Georgia 1988 1991 New Jersey 1988
Hawaii 1987 New York 1985
Idaho 1990 Ohio 2002 (2) 1998 (1)
Indiana 1987 Oklahoma 2004
Kansas 1993 Oregon 1988
Kentucky 1989 1995 Pennsylvania 2002 (2) 1981 (1)
Massachusetts 1987 Rhode Island 2002
Maine 1990 Utah 1987
Michigan 1987 Wisconsin 1995
Minnesota 1986 West Virginia 2003
Notes: Years of adoption and invalidation/repeal (if applicable) of laws reforming traditional collateral source rules
are indicated above. States are only included if their relevant malpractice laws varied over the 1979–2005 period.
Legislative variation is excluded from this table if it represents a situation in which an adoption and invalidation/
repeal occurred during the same year.
Source: Database of State Tort Law Reforms (2nd).
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expenditures associated with the care provided to a patient in the one-year period following
the new incidence of a serious heart condition.
Each of these malpractice reforms operates in some fashion to reduce expected
liability levels; however, each reform may have a unique impact on physician behavior
depending on the precise medical circumstances involved. For instance, where the harm
caused by a particular type of medical error is more likely to be associated with economic,
as opposed to noneconomic, damages and where the relevant harm can likely be treated by
subsequent remedial treatments (which may be reimbursed from third-party insurers), a
reform of the collateral source rule may be the provision more associated with a change in
physician behavior. On the other hand, where the potential damage caused by a given
course of action is of a more serious and irreversible nature, the effects of noneconomic
damage caps may be more significant in magnitude.
IV. Data and Empirical Methodology
Data on the history of each state’s tort laws comes from the Database of State Tort Law
Reforms (2nd Draft), compiled by Ronen Avraham.10 Likewise, data on physician behavior
are from the National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS), a nationally representative
survey of in-patient records from short-stay, nonfederal hospitals conducted annually by the
National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). For roughly 260,000 in-patient records per
year, the NHDS contains information on the primary/secondary diagnosis and procedure
codes associated with the discharge and on various characteristics of the relevant patient
and hospital. I supplement the public NHDS files with geographic identifiers received
pursuant to an agreement with the Research Data Center at the NCHS (all empirical work
was conducted onsite at the NCHS headquarters). The sample employed in this utilization
analysis covers the years 1979 to 2005.
Using the diagnosis codes and other information provided in the NHDS records, I
determine whether an episiotomy or cesarean was performed in connection with each
individual discharge, in addition to determining the length of the stay associated with each
discharge. I then evaluate these utilization measures over the proper subsample of indi-
vidual discharges, as follows.
1. Cesarean Utilization and Number of Bed Days. To evaluate cesarean behavior and
delivery lengths of stay, I consider the subsample of all deliveries contained in the
NHDS files, determined using the appropriate diagnosis codes. This subsample is
well protected against sample selection concerns considering that virtually all
deliveries occur in in-patient settings—that is, the malpractice variables of interest
should not impact the denominator used in the utilization rate analysis.
2. Episiotomy Utilization. To evaluate episiotomy utilization, I consider the subsample
of vaginal deliveries, which differs from the above subsample, by excluding those
deliveries performed via cesarean section. This subsample, however, is more
10The regression results presented below remain virtually unchanged when using the fourth edition of the Database
of State Tort Law Reforms.
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prone to sample selection issues given that malpractice forces may impact the
number of cesareans performed in the relevant states and potentially impact the
composition of the resulting vaginal sample. I partially alleviate these concerns by
including controls for the case mix of the individual vaginal delivery, which I
parameterize using the delivery’s predicted probability of cesarean delivery (i.e.,
a measure of the appropriateness for cesarean delivery), calculated as set forth
below.11
Descriptive statistics for the key utilization, legal, and outcome variables discussed in
the analysis below are provided in Table 3. Episiotomies are performed on roughly 40
percent of the vaginal delivery sample, while cesareans are performed on nearly 24 percent
of the total delivery sample. The average mother spends 2.8 days at the hospital during each
delivery stay.
With respect to each of the above utilization measures, I first test for evidence of
defensive behavior by estimating the following basic difference-in-difference specification:
U CAPi s t s t s t i s t, , , , , ,= + + + +α γ λ β ε1 (1)
where s indexes state, t indexes year, and i indexes an individual discharge from the
appropriate subsample; CAPs,t represents an indicator variable for the presence of a cap on
noneconomic damages in state s and year t; and state fixed effects, gs, and year fixed effects,
lt, control for fixed differences across states and across years, respectively. In the episiotomy
and cesarean specifications, Ui,s,t is an indicator variable for the incidence of the relevant
utilization measure. In the delivery length-of-stay specification, Ui,s,t equals the log of the
number of days that the mother spends in the hospital during the delivery admission. The
coefficient of interest in each specification is b1, representing the relationship between
the relevant utilization measure and the adoption of noneconomic damage caps.
I then test the robustness of the above findings to the inclusion of a range of
individual and state-year factors by estimating the following specification:
U CAP X Z Oi s t s t s t s t i s t s t s t i s t, , , , , , , , , ,= + + + + + + + +α γ λ ϕ β β β β ε1 2 3 4 , (2)
where Xi,s,t represents certain characteristics of the individual discharge: mother’s age
(15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, and 40+ years old); mother’s race (white, black, and
other); mother’s insurance status (private, government, no insurance, and other); hospital
bed size (0–100, 100–200, 200–300, 300–500, and 500+ beds); and hospital ownership type
(proprietary, nonprofit, and government).12 Zs,t represents certain state-year characteristics
11Sample selection concerns are further mitigated in the episiotomy specifications by the fact that I document virtually
no relationship between the considered tort reforms and the rate at which physicians deliver via cesarean section (as
opposed to a vaginal delivery).
12For the cesarean and episiotomy specifications (which use a binary dependent variable), I follow Currie and
MacLeod (2008) in estimating a linear probability model (LPM). While LPMs have the benefit of offering more
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(HMO penetration rate and its square, OB/GYN concentration rate, fertility rate, and
median household income). Os,t is a matrix representing a set of indicator variables for the
incidence of the following tort/malpractice provisions: (1) collateral source rule reforms,
(2) caps on punitive damages, and (3) “indirect” tort provisions. I include state-specific
readily interpretable coefficients, they raise various estimation concerns, including the nonnormality of the error
terms and the fact that the predicted values of the dependent variable are not bounded to the unit interval. The
estimates presented below, however, are robust to the alternative use of probit and logit models. With respect to
the length-of-stay specifications, I log-transform the bed days variable, consistent with much of the relevant
length-of-stay literature (see, e.g., Austin et al. 2002). It is believed that this logarithmic transformation will better
achieve normalization of the length-of-stay error distribution. This log-transformed ordinary least squares approach,
however, may generate biased estimates in the face of heteroskedastic error terms on the log scale (Manning &
Mullahy 2001).
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables
Mean
(SD)
Panel A: Utilization Rates (NHDS)
Episiotomy (from sample of vaginal deliveries) 41.1
(49.2)




Panel B: Outcome Measures (Natality Data)
Apgar scores (5-minute) 8.97
(0.86)
“Good” Apgar score (>= 7) 98.4
(12.7)
Panel C: Tort Variables (in NHDS Sample)
Noneconomic damage caps 39.9
(49.0)
Noneconomic damage caps: adoption-only states 44.2
(49.7)
Collateral source rule reform 58.7
(49.2)
Punitive damage cap 40.5
(49.1)
“Indirect” tort reform 75.7
(42.9)
N (full delivery sample) 737,193
N (vaginal delivery sample) 564,683
N (Natality data) 10,431,241
Notes: All statistics are multiplied by 100, with the exception of those presented for five-minute Apgar scores.
Reported statistics for Panels A and C are from an individual sample of deliveries from the 1979–2005 National
Hospital Discharge Survey records. Episiotomy utilization rates are presented from the subsample of vaginal deliv-
eries. Statistics for the tort variables are presented out of the full delivery sample in the NHDS records. The statistics
for the tort variables are nearly identical (not shown) using the subsample of vaginal deliveries. Statistics reported in
Panel B are from a 10 percent random sample of the 1978–2004 Natality Detail files.
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linear time trends, js,t, to control for slowly moving correlations between the relevant
utilization rates in a state and the adoption of tort reforms by that state.13
I also include controls in Xi,s,t to account for the case mix of the relevant delivery. I
parameterize the delivery case mix using the predicted probability of cesarean section
(PPC) for the relevant delivery, calculated according to Frakes (forthcoming).14 Each
delivery’s PPC value is simply a single parameterization of a much richer set of risk factors
and delivery complications. The results are generally robust to the inclusion of a set of
individual indicator variables for each risk factor and to the exclusion of these risk-factor
controls entirely. In the delivery bed-days specification, I also include controls for the
incidence of cesarean delivery and episiotomy utilization (each of which generally length-
ens a delivery stay) in order to target the investigation on the length-of-stay decision itself
or at least to create a better proxy for any other procedures (i.e., other than cesarean
sections and episiotomies) performed during the mother’s stay.
A key identification concern in difference-in-difference models of the above nature is
posed by the possibility of underlying trends—for example, differential utilization trends
between treatment and control states that predate the adoption of the tort reforms in
question. The primary results presented above partially account for this concern by includ-
ing state-specific linear time tends. As a falsification test, I also check for the presence of
underlying trends by modifying the above specifications to include “leads” of the relevant
tort variables—that is, indicator variables that switch from 0 to 1 in the year(s) prior to the
actual adoption of the reforms. Under the assumption that there are no such differential
trends that predate the relevant reforms, the coefficients of the lead indicator variables
should not differ significantly from zero.
Most of the variation in damage cap laws throughout the sample derives from the
initial adoption of the relevant provision, but a number of states also invalidated or
repealed previously adopted damage caps (eight states) throughout the sample. Following
Matsa (2007), I also estimate specifications that drop these adopt-then-invalidate states.
This more restricted approach accounts for the possibility that physicians will be less
responsive to the relevant sources of malpractice pressure in those states that face a high
probability of dropping damage caps (which I identify by the actual act of invalidation/
13Frakes (forthcoming) documents a relationship between the adoption of laws requiring physicians to follow national
(as opposed to local) standards and a resulting convergence in physician practices across regions. In light of the fact
that two of the damage cap treatment states used in the defensive medicine analysis below (Hawaii and Texas) were
dropped from the specifications estimated in Frakes (forthcoming) (due to an inability to classify the full history of
their standard of care laws), I exclude controls for national standard laws in the specifications estimated below and
focus instead on damage caps and related provisions. However, the results presented below are robust to the inclusion
of controls for national standard laws (not shown).
14In specifying a mother’s appropriateness/need for cesarean delivery, I calculate the relevant mother’s predicted
probability of receiving a cesarean section using fitted values of a logit model (estimated annually) of the incidence
of cesarean delivery on a set of individual risk factors and complications. Such factors include maternal age, breech
presentation, multiple deliveries (e.g., twins), previous cesarean delivery, placenta previa, placenta abruption, dys-
functional labor, cephalopelvic disproportion, fetal distress, precipitous labor, postpartum hemorrhage, prolonged
labor, premature rupture of the membranes, cord prolapse, maternal hypertension, maternal diabetes, and maternal
anemia.
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repeal).15 Moreover, even in situations where these invalidated sources of variation are
more strongly associated with physician behavior, there may still be a concern that physi-
cians anticipate the upcoming change in law and alter their behavior ahead of time
(understanding its likely retroactive effect). Any such anticipation effects will confound the
ability to perform the falsification exercises discussed above and accordingly test for differ-
ential trends in utilization rates between treatment and control states that may otherwise be
reflective of omitted factors.
Finally, to complete the defensive medicine analysis, I estimate the above specifica-
tions using five-minute Apgar scores as the relevant dependent variable. Data on individual
Apgar scores are from the 1978–2004 Natality files, compiled as part of the National Vital
Statistics System of the National Center for Health Statistics. The Natality files provide
demographic and health data for a 100 percent sample of all births occurring in the
post-1985 period and either a 50 percent or a 100 percent sample, depending on the state,
of all births occurring in the pre-1985 period. Included in the delivery-related data available
throughout the entire sample are five-minute Apgar scores. Given immediately after birth,
Apgar tests are designed to assess the health of a newborn infant and to determine the need
for resuscitative efforts. Scores are given on a scale from 0 to 10 and assess a newborn’s
activity, pulse, reflex irritation, appearance, and respiration. While Apgar scores arguably
remain inappropriate as predictors of certain long-term outcomes, five-minute scores none-
theless remain valid predictors of neonatal mortality (Casey et al. 2001).
V. Results
Tables 4–6 present the primary estimation results for this defensive medicine analysis,
demonstrating the relationship between various tort reform adoptions and (1) episiotomy
utilization, (2) delivery length-of-stay decisions, and (3) cesarean utilization, respectively.
Table 7 likewise presents estimation results for the effect of the relevant tort reforms on
neonatal health outcomes. All regression coefficients and standard errors presented in
Tables 4–7 are multiplied by 100. Moreover, standard errors are clustered at the state level
to allow for arbitrary within-state correlations of the error structure (Bertrand et al. 2004).
A. Episiotomy Utilization
I begin with an exploration into whether malpractice pressure induces physicians to
perform additional episiotomies during vaginal deliveries, consistent with a positive defen-
sive medicine story. Specifically, I identify any such effect by determining whether the
adoption of malpractice reforms that reduce expected liability amounts (primarily, caps on
noneconomic damages) lead to a reduction in episiotomy utilization rates. Column 1 of
Table 4 presents estimates of a basic difference-in-difference (DD) specification that
excludes the set of control variables and state-specific linear time trends. Consistent with
15In such states, physicians may indeed alter their behavior with this constitutional uncertainty in mind, considering
that any such repeal will likely have retroactive effect (Currie & MacLeod 2008).
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the informal expectations indicated in Section III, I find that the adoption of a law capping
noneconomic damage awards by a state is associated with a 4.6 percentage point reduction
in the episiotomy utilization rate of that state, representing an 11 percent reduction in the
average state episiotomy rate over the sample period.
In Columns 2–4 of Table 4, I demonstrate the sensitivity of these basic results to the
inclusion of various control variables and state-specific linear time trends (Columns 2 and
4), along with the addition of lead dummy variables for the noneconomic damage cap laws
(that switch two years prior to an amendment in noneconomic damage cap provisions),
which allow for a test of trends in episiotomy rates that predate the adoption of noneco-
nomic damage caps (Columns 3 and 4). As demonstrated by Column 2, the estimated
relationship between noneconomic damage caps and episiotomy utilization does not
Table 4: Episiotomy Utilization: Difference-in-Difference Estimates (Among Sample of
Vaginal Deliveries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Noneconomic Damage Cap
Contemporaneous dummy -4.61* -5.90** -3.75 -3.15 -8.01**
(2.60) (2.37) (2.38) (1.96) (3.61)
2-year lead dummy — — -1.32 -3.49** 2.96
(1.11) (1.74) (2.17)
Collateral Source Rule Reform
Contemporaneous dummy — 3.08 — 2.37 4.60
(3.02) (2.94) (3.61)
2-year lead dummy — — — 2.01 —
(1.73)
Punitive Damage Cap
Contemporaneous dummy — 0.37 — -0.88 0.16
(2.50) (1.94) (2.51)
2-year lead dummy — — — 2.54 —
(2.38)
“Indirect” Tort Law
Contemporaneous dummy — -2.45 — -2.63 -8.28***
(3.49) (2.62) (3.06)
2-year lead dummy — — — -1.74 —
(2.28)
Exclude states that invalidate damage caps? No No No No Yes
Control variables? No Yes No Yes Yes
State-specific linear trends? No Yes No Yes Yes
N 564,683 430,960 564,683 430,960 355,091
*Significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent.
Notes: All coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors corrected for within-
state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-
in-difference regressions, using a sample of vaginal deliveries, of the incidence of episiotomy utilization on
the adoption of noneconomic damage cap laws. The specifications estimated in Columns 2, 4, and 5 also include
additional state-year tort provisions along with state-specific linear time trends and other state-year controls. Columns
3–5 also include two-year lead indicator variables for the damage cap adoption dummies (which switch from 0 to
1 two years prior to the adoption of damage cap laws). Column 5 drops any state that varied its damage cap laws over
the sample period by invalidating or repealing a previously enacted damage cap provision. Data on episiotomy
utilization are from the 1979–2005 National Hospital Discharge Survey records.
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change substantially in magnitude with the addition of both state-specific linear time trends
and a set of controls for various patient, hospital, and state-year factors (from a 4.6
percentage point reduction to a 5.9 percentage point reduction). However, while the
p value from the basic DD specification is only 0.08, the estimated relationship does
become statistically significant at the 5 percent level with the inclusion of these additional
factors.
A concern arises, however, from the pattern of results presented in the dynamic
specifications estimated in Columns 3 and 4. The coefficients of the two-year lead indicator
variables are negative in both specifications and large enough in magnitude to suggest that
the differential in episiotomy rates between treatment and control states may have materi-
alized in the period prior to the adoption of noneconomic damage cap laws. However, this
finding may be due to the fact that a substantial portion of the variation in noneconomic
damage caps over the sample period arises from the invalidation or repeal of previously
adopted caps (affecting eight states), most often as a result of a finding of unconstitution-
ality by the relevant state’s highest court. Because a physician’s behavior in the preinvali-
dation period may be judged according to the postinvalidation law in such situations,
physicians in states that face a high probability of an unconstitutionality ruling may alter
their behavior in anticipation of such a ruling (Currie & MacLeod 2008; Matsa 2007).
In their investigation of cesarean practices, Currie and MacLeod (2008) find evi-
dence consistent with an anticipation story and estimate a statistically significant coeffi-
cient for the 12-month lead indicator for damage caps that turn “off” (at a magnitude
close to that of the contemporaneous law change coefficient); however, they estimate no
such lead effect for damage caps that turn “on.” With these concerns in mind, Matsa
(2007) excludes those states that invalidated or repealed previously adopted noneco-
nomic damage caps in his investigation of the relationship between tort reforms and
physician location.
In Column 5 of Table 4, I follow the approach taken by Matsa (2007) and estimate a
dynamic specification with lead indicator variables that excludes those states that have
invalidated or repealed noneconomic damage caps at some point over the sample period.
Focusing only on the initial adoption of damage cap provisions, I continue to estimate a
negative relationship between damage caps and episiotomy utilization rates, though now at
a slightly higher magnitude (8 percentage point reduction). However, I now estimate a
positive, statistically insignificant coefficient for the two-year lead indicator (with a magni-
tude of 3), strengthening any argument of a causal connection between damage cap
adoptions and reduced episiotomy utilization.16
The results presented in Table 4 also suggest a negative relationship between epi-
siotomy utilization rates and the incidence of an “indirect” tort reform, though these
estimates are statistically insignificant in the general full-state specifications and may have
16In unreported regressions, I also include lagged coefficients of the relevant tort variables and find evidence
suggesting that the estimated impact of noneconomic damage cap adoptions materialized in the immediate after-
math of the reforms and intensified over time (i.e., roughly half the estimated postreform impact occurred in the
immediate two-year period following the reform and the other half in the subsequent years).
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materialized in the preadoption period.17 While I find evidence that noneconomic damage
cap adoptions lead to a reduction in episiotomy utilization, I estimate an opposite-signed
coefficient (of similar, but smaller, magnitude) for the collateral source rule reform
dummy; however, this estimate is not significantly different from zero and the lead coeffi-
cients likewise suggest that this positive relationship may simply be reflective of a preexist-
ing differential trend.
B. Delivery Length of Stay
In Table 5, I test for evidence of positive defensive behavior in a physician’s decision
concerning the number of days that a mother should spend at the hospital during her
delivery stay. I again identify any such effect by observing the physician response to tort
reforms that reduce expected liability amounts. In Column 1, I begin by estimating a
simple DD specification, without controls or state-specific linear time trends, identifying
the relationship between noneconomic damage cap adoptions and the log of the number
of bed days associated with the mother’s hospitalization. Consistent with an expectation
of positive defensive behavior in the length-of-stay decision, I find that the adoption of a
law capping noneconomic damage awards by a state is associated with an approximately
3.9 percent reduction in the average maternal length of stay in that state (with a p value
of 0.09).18
In Columns 2–4 of Table 5, I again demonstrate the sensitivity of these basic results
to the inclusion of various control variables (e.g., HMO penetration rates at the state-year
level) and state-specific linear time trends (Columns 2 and 4), along with the addition of
lead dummy variables for the noneconomic damage cap laws (Columns 3 and 4). As
demonstrated by Column 2, the estimated relationship between noneconomic damage caps
and delivery bed days remains similar in magnitude with the addition of both control
variables and state-specific linear time trends. However, as with the case of episiotomy
utilization, the inclusion of these additional factors reduces the estimated standard error of
the damage cap coefficient and thereby reduces the associated p value (from a test of no
relationship) to 0.04.
I estimate negative coefficients for the two-year lead indicator variables in each of the
specifications estimated in Columns 3–5 of Table 5, the last of which drops those states that
invalidated or repealed previously adopted damage caps over the sample period. However,
the lead coefficients in each instance are statistically insignificant and they are of relatively
17One of the components of the indirect reform category is a reform of the joint and several liability rule. In alternate
specifications that break out the individual components of the indirect category, I estimate that the adoption of a joint
and several liability reform is associated with a roughly 4.9 percentage point reduction (significant at 10 percent) in
the rate of episiotomy utilization.
18This estimate suggests an average reduction of roughly 2.6 hours per delivery. While perhaps modest in relative
terms, a 4 percent reduction in the length of stay may represent a large absolute reduction in the cost of deliveries,
considering (1) that, on average, each delivery costs $3,500 (or roughly $1,300 per delivery bed day) (Russo et al.
2006), and (2) the significant number of deliveries performed in U.S. hospitals each year (deliveries represent the
most common medical event in the NHDS records).
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modest magnitude in the repeal specification (Column 5), providing only weak evidence to
suggest that the negative differential in delivery lengths of stay between treatment and
control states may have begun in the period prior to the adoption of noneconomic damage
cap laws.19 As in the case of episiotomy utilization, I estimate a negative association between
the duration of a mother’s hospital stay and the adoption of an “indirect” tort reform,
19In unreported regressions, I again include lagged coefficients of the relevant tort variables and find evidence
suggesting that the estimated impact of noneconomic damage cap adoptions on delivery lengths of stay materialized
in the immediate aftermath of the reforms and intensified over time (as with the episiotomy specification, I find that
roughly half the estimated postreform impact occurred in the immediate two-year period following the reform and
the other half in the subsequent years).
Table 5: Delivery Bed Days: Difference-in-Difference Estimates
(Among Sample of All Deliveries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Noneconomic Damage Cap
Contemporaneous dummy -3.86* -3.61** -3.14 -2.79** -4.57
(2.28) (1.74) (2.32) (1.31) (2.74)
2-year lead dummy — — -1.12 -1.47 -0.71
(1.36) (1.13) (1.69)
Collateral Source Rule Reform
Contemporaneous dummy — 2.85 — 2.09 4.72**
(1.76) (1.44) (1.81)
2-year lead dummy — — — 1.46 —
(1.00)
Punitive Damage Cap
Contemporaneous dummy — 2.07 — 2.73 0.03
(1.42) (1.98) (2.14)
2-year lead dummy — — — -1.32 —
(2.54)
“Indirect” Tort Law
Contemporaneous dummy — -3.42* — -4.10** -4.99**
(1.73) (1.60) (2.44)
2-year lead dummy — — — 1.16 —
(1.03)
Exclude states that invalidate damage caps? No No No No Yes
Control variables? No Yes No Yes Yes
State-specific linear trends? No Yes No Yes Yes
N 737,193 565,201 737,193 565,201 465,153
*Significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent.
Notes: All coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors corrected for within-
state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-
in-difference regressions, using a sample of vaginal and cesarean deliveries, of the number of bed days associated with
an individual delivery stay (logged) on the adoption of noneconomic damage cap laws. The specifications estimated
in Columns 2, 4, and 5 also include additional state-year tort provisions along with state-specific linear time trends and
other state-year controls. Columns 3–5 also include two-year lead indicator variables for the damage cap adoption
dummies (which switch from 0 to 1 two years prior to the adoption of damage cap laws). Column 5 drops any state
that varied its damage cap laws over the sample period by invalidating or repealing a previously enacted damage cap
provision. Data on delivery lengths of stay are from the 1979–2005 National Hospital Discharge Survey records.
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providing further evidence of a positive defensive response in a physician’s length-of-stay
decision to the threat of possible malpractice liability.20
Also consistent with the findings of the episiotomy specifications, I estimate that a
reform of the collateral source rule is associated with an increase in the number of delivery
bed days. Again, however, this estimate is noisy in the full-state specifications and may also
be reflective of an underlying differential trend between treatment and control states
(Column 4 of Table 5). In any event, regardless of whether it is reasonable to expect an
opposite-signed result between the damages cap coefficient and the collateral source rule
reform coefficient, it may be reasonable to expect that each such reform will be associated
with a different impact on the equilibrium length-of-stay measure, particularly considering
the way the type of damages implicated by this specific medical context (e.g., noneconomic
vs. economic) interacts with the type of liability risk associated with this medical decision
(e.g., liability risk for improperly treating a condition vs. liability risk for executing the
procedure/medical decision itself). For instance, under a traditional collateral source rule,
the decision to keep a mother an extra day in the hospital may partially expose physicians
to greater liability simply because that extra day itself may be part of the economic damages
they are expected to pay in the event that some other aspect of the care leads to malpractice
liability.21 A collateral source rule reform may eliminate the requirement to pay for that cost
if it is otherwise covered by a third party (a force that contributes to a positive relationship
between such reforms and the resulting length-of-stay measure). Considerations of this
specific nature, however, would not be a part of the noneconomic damages calculation.
The middle of the 1990s experienced a wave of reforms mandating lengths of
coverage for hospital maternity visits, culminating with the passage of a federal law. To the
extent that the differential adoption of such reforms may have been related to a state’s
prevailing malpractice rules, a concern arises regarding the consistency of the coefficients
estimated in Table 5. To alleviate this concern, I estimate specifications that simply exclude
the 1995 to 1997 period from the sample (during which all of the relevant rules were
passed). The estimated pattern of coefficients remains essentially unchanged under this
restricted sample.
C. Cesarean Utilization
In Table 6, I test for evidence of defensive behavior in a physician’s decision to perform a
cesarean delivery. Table 6 follows the same structure as Tables 4 and 5 discussed above.
In each specification, I estimate small and statistically insignificant coefficients for each of
the malpractice provisions explored, including caps on noneconomic damages. These
results generally provide no evidence in support of the popular perception that malprac-
tice pressures induce physicians to perform a substantially greater number of cesarean
20In alternate specifications that break out the individual components of the indirect category, I estimate that the
adoption of a joint and several liability reform is associated with a roughly 6 percent increase in the average delivery
length of stay.
21Of course, the decision to keep a mother an extra day may be associated with countervailing reductions in expected
economic damage awards in light of other risk considerations.
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deliveries. In the specification that includes both state-specific linear time trends and a set
of control variables, as presented in Column 2, I find that the adoption of a noneconomic
damage cap is associated with a statistically insignificant 0.1 percentage point reduction in
a state’s cesarean rate. Even assuming that the true effect is at the lower end of the estimated
95 percent confidence interval for this coefficient, the adoption of a noneconomic damage
cap would only be associated with a -1.2 percentage point reduction in prevailing cesarean
rates, representing a relatively modest 5 percent reduction in the prevailing cesarean rate.22
22In alternate specifications that break out the individual components of the indirect category, I estimate that the
adoption of a joint and several liability reform is associated with a roughly 0.5 percentage point increase in cesarean
utilization (though statistically indistinguishable from 0, with a 95 percent confidence interval from –0.4 to 1.4). This
Table 6: Cesarean Section Utilization: Difference-in-Difference Estimates (Among
Sample of All Deliveries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Noneconomic Damage Cap
Contemporaneous dummy 0.07 -0.10 0.13 0.25 0.47
(0.63) (0.57) (0.55) (0.53) (1.09)
2-year lead dummy — — -0.09 -0.47 0.31
(0.50) (0.35) (0.62)
Collateral Source Rule Reform
Contemporaneous dummy — 0.36 — 0.49 0.43
(0.58) (0.44) (0.69)
2-year lead dummy — — — -0.30 —
(0.49)
Punitive Damage Cap
Contemporaneous dummy — -0.33 — -0.33 -0.71
(0.44) (0.45) (0.70)
2-year lead dummy — — — -0.01 —
(0.46)
“Indirect” Tort Law
Contemporaneous dummy — 0.00 — -0.09 -0.73
(0.67) (0.62) (1.09)
2-year lead dummy — — — 0.06 —
(0.46)
Exclude states that invalidate damage caps? No No No No Yes
Control variables? No Yes No Yes Yes
State-specific linear trends? No Yes No Yes Yes
N 737,193 565,201 737,193 565,201 465,153
*Significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent.
Notes: All coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors corrected for within-
state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-
in-difference regressions, using a sample of all deliveries, of the incidence of cesarean section utilization on the
adoption of noneconomic damage cap laws. The specifications estimated in Columns 2, 4, and 5 also include
additional state-year tort provisions along with state-specific linear time trends and other state-year controls. Columns
3–5 also include two-year lead indicator variables for the damage cap adoption dummies (which switch from 0 to
1 two years prior to the adoption of damage cap laws). Column 5 drops any state that varied its damage cap laws over
the sample period by invalidating or repealing a previously enacted damage cap provision. Data on cesarean
utilization are from the 1979–2005 National Hospital Discharge Survey records.
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These estimates confirm the findings presented in Currie and MacLeod (2008) to the
extent that they too challenge the conventional wisdom that malpractice pressure is respon-
sible for much of the excess in cesarean utilization. However, the estimates do suggest that
if the relationship between noneconomic damage caps and cesarean utilization is positive
in nature (i.e., contrary to the conventional wisdom), it is likely to be at a magnitude lower
than that estimated by Currie and MacLeod, given that their estimated damage cap coef-
ficient of 1.2 is above the upper end of the 95 percent confidence interval for the estimated
damage cap coefficient indicated in Column 2 of Table 6.
D. Health Outcomes
The above results indicate that malpractice pressure may lead to certain increases in the
intensity of care provided by obstetricians in the delivery of children, including increased
utilization rates for episiotomies and increased delivery lengths of stay. It is of course
possible that these positive utilization forces do not meet the definition of “defensive”
behavior put forth above, in that they are actually associated with improvements in relevant
health outcomes in the affected states. I explore this possibility in Table 7, presenting
is in contrast to the estimated –1.7 percentage point reduction in cesarean rates following joint and several liability
reforms estimated in Currie and MacLeod (2008). Even at the bottom of the estimated confidence interval, I estimate
an impact of these reforms that exceeds Currie and MacLeod’s estimate (i.e., that is less negative than their estimate).
Table 7: Five-Minute Apgar Scores: Difference-in-Difference Estimates (Among Sample of
All Deliveries)
(1) (2)
Log(Apgar Score Level) “Good” Apgar Score (0/1)
Noneconomic damage cap dummy 0.01 -0.00
(0.09) (0.03)
Collateral source rule reform dummy 0.12 0.01
(0.09) (0.03)
Punitive damage cap dummy -0.10 -0.05
(0.12) 0.03
“Indirect” tort law dummy 0.10 0.11**
(0.08) (0.03)
Sample All states All states
Control variables and state-specific trends? Yes Yes
N 7,450,600 7,450,600
*Significant at 5 percent; **significant at 1 percent.
Notes: All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the
error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions, using a
sample of cesarean and vaginal deliveries, of the log of each individual Apgar score associated with the delivery
(Column 1), or the individual incidence of a “good” Apgar score (Column 2), on the adoption of noneconomic
damage cap laws and other tort provisions. Apgar scores of 0 are set to 0.1 prior to the log transformation in Columns
1 and 2. Each specification also includes a set of individual demographic and other state-year controls, in addition to
state-specific linear time trends. Data on neonatal outcomes is from a 10 percent sample of all deliveries in the
1978–2004 Natality Detail files.
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estimates of the relationship between the adoption of noneconomic damage caps (and
related tort reforms) and the five-minute Apgar scores assigned to each newborn in a
sample of both cesarean and vaginal deliveries from the 1978–2004 Natality Detail files.
Given the disconnect in the timing of this outcome measure (i.e., at delivery) and the
delivery length-of-stay measure (i.e., postdelivery), this exercise is only useful in assessing
the potential defensive nature of delivery lengths of stay to the extent that this measure also
proxies for other utilization decisions made at or prior to delivery.
In Column 1 of Table 7, I present estimation results for difference-in-difference
specifications that use the log of the five-minute Apgar score as the dependent variable
(with full control variables and state-specific linear time trends). Column 2 analo-
gously estimates specifications that use the incidence of a “good” Apgar score (greater
than or equal to 7) as the dependent variable. In each specification, I estimate very
small, statistically insignificant coefficients for the damage cap and collateral source rule
reform measures. For instance, while noneconomic damage cap adoptions are associated
with a 10–20 percent reduction in the episiotomy utilization rate (4–8 percentage point
reduction) and a roughly 4 percent reduction in the average delivery length of
stay, I estimate that they are associated with a 0.01 percentage point increase in individual
five-minute Apgar scores. Even assuming that the estimated effect of damage cap adop-
tions is at the lower end of the relevant 95 percent confidence interval, the estimated
effect would still entail a minor 0.2 percentage point reduction in individual Apgar
scores.
Consistent with a defensive medicine story, these findings suggest that the positive
utilization pressures created by malpractice fears do not generate corresponding improve-
ments in health outcomes to the affected patient population.23 If anything, the estimated
positive coefficients presented in Table 7 for the “indirect” malpractice reforms suggest that
the documented reductions in utilization rates stemming from “indirect” reform adoptions
may be associated with improvements in neonatal health, implying that malpractice pres-
sures felt prior to these “indirect” reforms both increased utilization rates and depressed
neonatal health outcomes.
Of course, the implications of this health outcomes analysis (and, in turn, the
implications for the defensive medicine determination) are limited by the unavailability
of state-year data covering a more complete set of relevant health outcomes over the
sample period, including those outcomes respecting maternal conditions. Episiotomies,
for instance, have not always been indicated solely for the benefit of the newborn.
Though certainly at a decreasing rate over time, many physicians have also performed
episiotomies under the belief that the incision would reduce the risk of severe tears to
the perineal skin. Absent data on the proper maternal morbidity measures, it is difficult
to assess whether any malpractice-induced increases in episiotomy utilization are accom-
panied by associated improvements in maternal health outcomes.
23Moreover, the pattern of results presented in Table 7 remains largely unchanged when I drop those states that
repeal previously adopted damage cap laws over the sample period.
Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Practices 479
VI. Conclusion
This article contributes to an understanding of the manner in which malpractice pressure
may shape physician behavior. For the purposes of this investigation, I focus on certain
decisions faced by obstetricians during (and immediately after) the delivery of a child, a
medical context that often implicates significant malpractice concerns. Consistent with
much of the relevant literature, I use adoptions of various malpractice/tort reforms to
identify within-state variations in malpractice pressure. However, unlike the analysis under-
taken by Currie and MacLeod (2008), which addresses a substantially similar set of ques-
tions, I draw on a data set of hospital discharge records that allows for the identification of
variation in physician behavior over the entire 1980s, a time period during which the most
significant and relevant sources of legal variation occurred. The richness of the legal
variation provided by this longer sample period provides greater confidence in the consis-
tency of the estimated results. The results of this analysis confirm the findings of Currie and
MacLeod to the extent that I find evidence inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that
malpractice pressure contributes significantly to the excessive cesarean utilization rates
observed across regions.
Extending this analysis to other aspects of obstetric care, I find evidence consistent
with positive defensive behavior in the utilization of episiotomies during vaginal deliveries
and in the durations of maternal lengths of stay. In each instance, I estimate that the
adoption of a noneconomic damage cap leads to a reduction in the relevant utilization
measure without a corresponding change in observed neonatal outcomes, implying that
malpractice pressure may have previously induced overutilization of these measures. These
findings are intuitive considering that the imbalance of risks involved in the relevant
decision context may induce a risk-averse physician to elect the arguably unnecessary
procedure (or additional bed day). In the cesarean context, however, the risks associated
with the procedure may be high enough and the medical circumstances of the marginal
cesarean mother may be minor enough that the balance of risks may not tip strongly in the
direction of positive defensive medicine.
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